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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion threat-model.json
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -686,7 +686,7 @@
"parameter": "/api/v1/automations (save, try, run now, decide, draft from a sentence), the MCP and assistant automation tools: triggers, where and If match trees, the event workflow graph (action params are Jinja templates), policy, limits, an activity id; the text of the activities an automation runs on",
"attacker_controllable": "yes",
"component": "assistant",
"caller_must_enforce": "none — it runs as its maker with their permissions at run time (P-AUTOMATION-ACTOR); actions reaching outside Lens ask first; outside text marks intents untrusted and breaks up links (P-INJECTION-EGRESS); chains and bursts are bounded (P-AUTOMATION-LOOP)",
"caller_must_enforce": "none — it runs as its maker with their permissions at run time (P-AUTOMATION-ACTOR); actions reaching outside Lens ask first; outside text marks intents untrusted and breaks up links (P-INJECTION-EGRESS); chains and bursts are bounded (P-AUTOMATION-LOOP); `matches` patterns refuse nested repeats and repeated alternatives that start alike, read at most 20,000 characters and give up after 50 ms",
"provenance": "documented",
"source": "docs/automations.md \"Running automations\""
},
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4 changes: 3 additions & 1 deletion threat-model.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -650,7 +650,9 @@ its person can read; "read" does not mean "public".

- **Prompt injection**: bounded by the person's tools, not by filtering (N-PROMPT). **Bombs**: not bounded beyond
upload size and page caps (N-BOMBS). **ReDoS**: Cypher refuses nested repeats heuristically; admin regexes are
trusted (Q25). **XXE and billion laughs**: RDF/XML is refused (N-RDF-XML); docx XML goes to the stdlib parser (Q22).
trusted (Q25). Patterns in automations' conditions (`matches`, which members write and which run on outside text)
refuse nested repeats and repeated alternatives that start alike, read at most 20,000 characters and give up after
50 ms each. **XXE and billion laughs**: RDF/XML is refused (N-RDF-XML); docx XML goes to the stdlib parser (Q22).
- **SSRF**: in model for non-admin URLs (P-SSRF-GUARD) and guarded admin operands (P-ADMIN-GUARD); out for other
admin URLs (N-ADMIN). **CSRF**: no cookies on the API (N-CSRF), except the IIIF flow (Q1).
- **Brute force and volume DoS**: out beyond the sign-in throttles (N-VOLUME, N-THROTTLE-SCOPE). **Clickjacking**:
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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion threat-model.yaml
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ entry_points:
attacker_controllable: true
x-condition: "any editor, for automations in namespaces they edit; indirectly through activity text (mail, titles, chat) that reaches action params"
control_kinds: [callback/code, data, x-prompt-injection]
caller_must_enforce: "none — it runs as its maker with their permissions at run time (P-AUTOMATION-ACTOR); actions reaching outside Lens ask first; outside text marks intents untrusted and breaks up links (P-INJECTION-EGRESS); chains and bursts are bounded (P-AUTOMATION-LOOP)"
caller_must_enforce: "none — it runs as its maker with their permissions at run time (P-AUTOMATION-ACTOR); actions reaching outside Lens ask first; outside text marks intents untrusted and breaks up links (P-INJECTION-EGRESS); chains and bursts are bounded (P-AUTOMATION-LOOP); `matches` patterns refuse nested repeats and repeated alternatives that start alike, read at most 20,000 characters and give up after 50 ms"
provenance: {kind: documented, source: 'docs/automations.md "Running automations"'}
- id: "code sandbox"
component: assistant
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