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Split from #499 (Unit 2) per the design decision recorded there: the proved spike (docs/spikes/2026-06-21-gvproxy-attachment.md §5) established that gvproxy v0.8.9 has no per-client egress ACL API, and its management API is unix-socket-only / unreachable from a PTask — contradicting the 192.168.127.254:8080 HTTP assumption in the task body and architecture.md. Egress enforcement therefore cannot be "POST the rules to gvproxy"; it must be a relay-layer mechanism. This task owns that design.
Scope
R2.2 — egress allowlist enforcement via relay-layer frame inspection: parse Ethernet/IP headers in the net::switch relay and drop frames whose destination falls outside the session's allow_subnets / allow_protocols. Owns the security-mechanism design (header-parse surface, drop-vs-reject semantics, performance, fail-closed default).
Docs: correct architecture.md §"Unit 2" (the 192.168.127.254:8080 management-endpoint claim) to match the spike — unix-socket control surface; egress filtering at the relay.
Acceptance
Egress frames outside allow_subnets/allow_protocols are dropped at the relay; fail-closed when a policy is set.
R2.7 rate-limited tracing::warn! fires on real drops.
Activity
fix(minimald): bind ingress to loopback, align warn window and fields
feat(sessions,minimald): validate egress subnet CIDRs at launch
fix(sessions): reject reversed ingress dynamic_allowed_range
feat(sessions,minvmd): validate dynamic-range floor and vm_egress CIDRs
feat(sessions,minimald,minvmd): static ingress, session policy state,…
fix(docs): address CodeRabbit findings on networking test plan
fix(docs): address CodeRabbit findings on networking test plan