From fbd22c44d3470781ac5b3c417b2eb15db49a15c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Norrie Taylor Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2026 21:38:02 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1/8] docs(specs): refuse names a box's allow list does not match before forwarding upstream Spec 18 had no requirement for the non-matching case of a box's egress.allow_dns_hosts. NET-066 covers only matched names. Design section 5.3 states the rule as normative ("Non-matching names are refused"), and the spec's own annotation on NET-003 assumes it. Add NET-141, the complement of NET-066. --- .../specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md b/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md index 16ad9193bd..7d46c7dc78 100644 --- a/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md +++ b/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ owner: norrietaylor epic: gominimal/inbox#646 arch: https://github.com/gominimal/arch/blob/5c1201517ba07347344fb9725efb06ee39d5c03e/specs/networking/deployment-and-egress-gateway.md arch_sha: "5c1201517ba07347344fb9725efb06ee39d5c03e" -updated: 2026-09-25 +updated: 2026-10-06 --- # NET — Box networking on the local host: preview by name and bounded egress @@ -449,6 +449,11 @@ included, with every refusal logged (NET-001 to NET-004). verify: cargo nextest run -p minimald dns_pinned_admission_window +- **NET-141** WHEN a box queries a name that its `egress.allow_dns_hosts` does not match and that is not in the box zone THE SYSTEM SHALL refuse the query without forwarding it upstream. + tier: T0 + verify: cargo nextest run -p minimald unmatched_name_refused_without_upstream_forward + + - **NET-067** IF an allowed name resolves into the box's `egress.deny_subnets` or the infrastructure deny set THEN THE SYSTEM SHALL refuse the connection. tier: T2 verify: cargo nextest run -p minimald denied_range_resolution_refused From 8b865c29e4202c08e2ccc57bd239210679023530 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Norrie Taylor Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2026 21:40:11 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 2/8] docs(specs): make NET-141 testable: REFUSED, one matcher, scope and tier Define the onward hop as any resolver beyond the one Minimal owns for the box, answer REFUSED rather than NXDOMAIN or a timeout, decide refusal with NET-066's matcher, scope the requirement to queries that reach Minimal's resolver (native host-address boxes are the conceded residual), raise it to T1 with a property, and add the egress invariant it covers. --- .../18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md b/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md index 7d46c7dc78..27ea6a5f1f 100644 --- a/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md +++ b/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md @@ -449,10 +449,11 @@ included, with every refusal logged (NET-001 to NET-004). verify: cargo nextest run -p minimald dns_pinned_admission_window -- **NET-141** WHEN a box queries a name that its `egress.allow_dns_hosts` does not match and that is not in the box zone THE SYSTEM SHALL refuse the query without forwarding it upstream. - tier: T0 +- **NET-141** WHEN a box queries a name that its `egress.allow_dns_hosts` does not match, as NET-066 matches names, and that is not in the box zone (NET-072, including `host.min.internal`), THE SYSTEM SHALL answer REFUSED and forward the query to no resolver beyond the one Minimal owns for the box. + tier: T1 verify: cargo nextest run -p minimald unmatched_name_refused_without_upstream_forward - + property: for every name, every allow-pattern set, and every zone, the resolver forwards the query beyond the one Minimal owns for the box only if the name matches a pattern, and it never forwards a name that matches none and is not in the zone + - **NET-067** IF an allowed name resolves into the box's `egress.deny_subnets` or the infrastructure deny set THEN THE SYSTEM SHALL refuse the connection. tier: T2 @@ -1173,6 +1174,11 @@ daemon does, and the attribute that makes that gap visible to policy is EHE's. set. enforced by: the rebinding intersection covered by: NET-066, NET-067 +- **Invariant:** THE SYSTEM SHALL carry no name that a box's allow list does + not match, outside the box zone, beyond the resolver Minimal owns for the + box. + enforced by: the refusal at that resolver, before any onward query + covered by: NET-141 - **Invariant:** THE SYSTEM SHALL publish a dynamically requested port only under a recorded allow decision. enforced by: the local daemon evaluates the same request shape as the From 264287f6ca91f5d9fb7bc095ce08d380f9ea9515 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Norrie Taylor Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2026 21:42:04 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 3/8] docs(specs): scope NET-141 and its invariant to the resolver Minimal owns Move the scope into the requirement's trigger and the invariant, name the native host-address bypass as the invariant's residual, and say which resolver Minimal owns for each box type: the relay's DNS gate for an own-address box, the node's DNS layer for a host-address box inside a VM-backed host once its routing lands. --- .../18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md b/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md index 27ea6a5f1f..234e1f8e55 100644 --- a/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md +++ b/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md @@ -449,11 +449,11 @@ included, with every refusal logged (NET-001 to NET-004). verify: cargo nextest run -p minimald dns_pinned_admission_window -- **NET-141** WHEN a box queries a name that its `egress.allow_dns_hosts` does not match, as NET-066 matches names, and that is not in the box zone (NET-072, including `host.min.internal`), THE SYSTEM SHALL answer REFUSED and forward the query to no resolver beyond the one Minimal owns for the box. +- **NET-141** WHEN the resolver Minimal owns for a box receives a query for a name that its `egress.allow_dns_hosts` does not match, as NET-066 matches names, and that is not in the box zone (NET-072, including `host.min.internal`), THE SYSTEM SHALL answer REFUSED and forward the query to no resolver beyond it. tier: T1 verify: cargo nextest run -p minimald unmatched_name_refused_without_upstream_forward property: for every name, every allow-pattern set, and every zone, the resolver forwards the query beyond the one Minimal owns for the box only if the name matches a pattern, and it never forwards a name that matches none and is not in the zone - + - **NET-067** IF an allowed name resolves into the box's `egress.deny_subnets` or the infrastructure deny set THEN THE SYSTEM SHALL refuse the connection. tier: T2 @@ -1176,9 +1176,13 @@ daemon does, and the attribute that makes that gap visible to policy is EHE's. covered by: NET-066, NET-067 - **Invariant:** THE SYSTEM SHALL carry no name that a box's allow list does not match, outside the box zone, beyond the resolver Minimal owns for the - box. + box, for every query that reaches that resolver. enforced by: the refusal at that resolver, before any onward query covered by: NET-141 + - **Invariant:** THE SYSTEM SHALL publish a dynamically requested port only under a recorded allow decision. enforced by: the local daemon evaluates the same request shape as the From af9dab6199da50635a26997b222d0b797f9af15f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Norrie Taylor Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2026 21:42:59 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 4/8] docs(specs): decide NET-141 host-side on a VM host and state its limits Match the invariant's enforcement to NET-066's two legs, require the VM-host proof at the host-side leg, record that minvmd cannot yet refuse a query, and state both limits visibly in Design reasoning. --- .../18-spec-box-networking.md | 18 ++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md b/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md index 234e1f8e55..d3fa9d1710 100644 --- a/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md +++ b/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md @@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ included, with every refusal logged (NET-001 to NET-004). tier: T1 verify: cargo nextest run -p minimald unmatched_name_refused_without_upstream_forward property: for every name, every allow-pattern set, and every zone, the resolver forwards the query beyond the one Minimal owns for the box only if the name matches a pattern, and it never forwards a name that matches none and is not in the zone - + - **NET-067** IF an allowed name resolves into the box's `egress.deny_subnets` or the infrastructure deny set THEN THE SYSTEM SHALL refuse the connection. tier: T2 @@ -1137,6 +1137,14 @@ What a native co-resident host cannot offer is an enforcement point outside its escape boundary ([design §7.4][design]); its egress rules hold only while the daemon does, and the attribute that makes that gap visible to policy is EHE's. +The invariant that no unmatched name travels beyond the resolver Minimal owns +for a box (NET-141) has two stated limits. A native host-address box shares the +host's network namespace. If its egress rules allow the host's own resolver, +it can query that resolver directly, and no Minimal resolver sees the query. +The design concedes this reduced tier for host-address boxes. On a VM-backed +host, the host-side DNS table cannot yet refuse a query. Until it can, the +refusal holds only inside the VM, below the escape boundary. + ## Security considerations - **Invariant:** THE SYSTEM SHALL admit no connection to a box, and no @@ -1177,12 +1185,10 @@ daemon does, and the attribute that makes that gap visible to policy is EHE's. - **Invariant:** THE SYSTEM SHALL carry no name that a box's allow list does not match, outside the box zone, beyond the resolver Minimal owns for the box, for every query that reaches that resolver. - enforced by: the refusal at that resolver, before any onward query + enforced by: the refusal at the resolver Minimal owns for the box; on a + VM-backed host, decided host-side (minvmd's DNS gate, outside the VM escape + boundary), with the in-VM gate as the precision copy covered by: NET-141 - - **Invariant:** THE SYSTEM SHALL publish a dynamically requested port only under a recorded allow decision. enforced by: the local daemon evaluates the same request shape as the From f17741a464990e65fd8963ba72163a6bf1578ba3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "minimal-foundry[bot]" <327719912+minimal-foundry[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2026 00:17:52 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 5/8] docs(specs): name NET-141's residual in its invariant's enforced by The invariant's enforced by claimed the VM-backed refusal is decided host-side in minvmd's DNS gate, while the design-reasoning paragraph the same branch added states minvmd cannot refuse a query yet, so the refusal holds only inside the VM. A reader of the invariant alone believed the host-side gate enforces the guarantee today. The enforced by now says where the refusal is answered, names the host-side leg as the residual until minvmd can refuse a query itself, and points at the design reasoning, which states both limits. --- .../specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md b/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md index d3fa9d1710..b141fc9ee6 100644 --- a/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md +++ b/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md @@ -1185,9 +1185,10 @@ refusal holds only inside the VM, below the escape boundary. - **Invariant:** THE SYSTEM SHALL carry no name that a box's allow list does not match, outside the box zone, beyond the resolver Minimal owns for the box, for every query that reaches that resolver. - enforced by: the refusal at the resolver Minimal owns for the box; on a - VM-backed host, decided host-side (minvmd's DNS gate, outside the VM escape - boundary), with the in-VM gate as the precision copy + enforced by: the refusal at the resolver Minimal owns for the box. On a + VM-backed host the in-VM gate makes it, until minvmd's host-side DNS gate + can refuse a query itself. That residual and the native host-address box's + bypass are the two limits stated in the design reasoning. covered by: NET-141 - **Invariant:** THE SYSTEM SHALL publish a dynamically requested port only under a recorded allow decision. From 9c8cb53effc06d064552a2ff51023a3fbafc7f19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Norrie Taylor Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2026 14:05:34 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 6/8] docs(specs): state what NET-141's tests prove and allow zone names in its property The session e2e's disallowed-name leg asserts only that the connection does not complete; the T1 property is the proof of no onward query. The property allows a zone name to be forwarded, as the relay does for an in-zone A query. The relay refuses only for a deny-all box today, so the partial allow list is a known gap. --- docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md b/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md index 50502bcfca..3527e80813 100644 --- a/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md +++ b/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ owner: norrietaylor epic: gominimal/inbox#646 arch: https://github.com/gominimal/arch/blob/5c1201517ba07347344fb9725efb06ee39d5c03e/specs/networking/deployment-and-egress-gateway.md arch_sha: "5c1201517ba07347344fb9725efb06ee39d5c03e" -updated: 2026-10-07 +updated: 2026-10-08 --- # NET — Box networking on the local host: preview by name and bounded egress @@ -452,8 +452,8 @@ included, with every refusal logged (NET-001 to NET-004). - **NET-141** WHEN the resolver Minimal owns for a box receives a query for a name that its `egress.allow_dns_hosts` does not match, as NET-066 matches names, and that is not in the box zone (NET-072, including `host.min.internal`), THE SYSTEM SHALL answer REFUSED and forward the query to no resolver beyond it. tier: T1 verify: cargo nextest run -p minimald unmatched_name_refused_without_upstream_forward - property: for every name, every allow-pattern set, and every zone, the resolver forwards the query beyond the one Minimal owns for the box only if the name matches a pattern, and it never forwards a name that matches none and is not in the zone - + property: for every name, every allow-pattern set, and every zone, the resolver forwards the query beyond the one Minimal owns for the box only if the name matches a pattern or is in the zone, and it never forwards a name that matches none and is not in the zone + - **NET-067** IF an allowed name resolves into the box's `egress.deny_subnets` or the infrastructure deny set THEN THE SYSTEM SHALL refuse the connection. tier: T2 From 1ee8aa48f1026e708d1513b51e29f34cd9d85942 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Norrie Taylor Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2026 14:32:57 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 7/8] docs(specs): name the e2e legs that NET-141's annotation describes The deny-all box's leg already asserts a fast resolution failure. Only the leg of the box with a partial allow list does not. --- docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md b/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md index 3527e80813..688a17b878 100644 --- a/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md +++ b/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md @@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ included, with every refusal logged (NET-001 to NET-004). tier: T1 verify: cargo nextest run -p minimald unmatched_name_refused_without_upstream_forward property: for every name, every allow-pattern set, and every zone, the resolver forwards the query beyond the one Minimal owns for the box only if the name matches a pattern or is in the zone, and it never forwards a name that matches none and is not in the zone - + - **NET-067** IF an allowed name resolves into the box's `egress.deny_subnets` or the infrastructure deny set THEN THE SYSTEM SHALL refuse the connection. tier: T2 From f990b8b43b8b4ee582891e921d7355d094f7f197 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Norrie Taylor Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2026 15:08:10 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 8/8] docs(specs): renumber the user-namespace activation gate to NET-143 NET-141 names the resolver's refusal of names a box's allow list does not match, the meaning the DNS gate code and the session e2e already cite. The user-namespace gate took the same number on main; it moves to NET-143 in the spec and in the comments that cite it. --- crates/minimal/tests/cli.rs | 8 ++++---- crates/minimald-rpc/src/lib.rs | 2 +- crates/minimald/src/main.rs | 4 ++-- crates/minimald/src/rpc.rs | 6 +++--- crates/minimald/src/server.rs | 6 +++--- crates/sandbox2/src/lib.rs | 6 +++--- .../18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md | 2 +- 7 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/crates/minimal/tests/cli.rs b/crates/minimal/tests/cli.rs index 23154c9b4a..251c3e85f7 100644 --- a/crates/minimal/tests/cli.rs +++ b/crates/minimal/tests/cli.rs @@ -1262,7 +1262,7 @@ async fn activate_prints_no_session_id_when_composition_fails() { /// Drives `min session activate` through the compiled binary against this /// process's harness daemon while its user-namespace verdict is `verdict` -/// (NET-141), and returns the refusal: the `error:` block on stderr, exactly +/// (NET-143), and returns the refusal: the `error:` block on stderr, exactly /// — the activation's own progress lines (`Applying loadouts: ...`) precede /// it. Asserts the contract every cause shares on the way: exit 1, nothing /// on stdout, and no session left behind. The binary is used because the @@ -1336,7 +1336,7 @@ async fn refused_activation(verdict: minimald::server::UsernsRestriction) -> Str } /// A host whose user-namespace verdict refuses the sandbox fails the -/// activation before any session exists (NET-141): the daemon refuses the +/// activation before any session exists (NET-143): the daemon refuses the /// create on its verdict, `min session activate` prints that refusal as its /// error, exits 1, and leaves no session behind. The cause-specific texts /// are the two tests below; this one holds the shape they share. @@ -1405,7 +1405,7 @@ async fn activate_refusal_names_sysctl_for_max_user_namespaces_zero() { } /// Drives `min task run` through the compiled binary against this process's -/// harness daemon while its user-namespace verdict is `verdict` (NET-141), +/// harness daemon while its user-namespace verdict is `verdict` (NET-143), /// and returns the refusal: the `error:` block on stderr, exactly. A task /// run creates its ephemeral session through the same create the daemon /// refuses, so the refusal must reach the user as the daemon's verdict — @@ -1480,7 +1480,7 @@ async fn refused_task_run(verdict: minimald::server::UsernsRestriction) -> Strin } /// A refused host reaches `min task run` through the same create as an -/// activate, so the refusal is the machine verdict there too (NET-141): +/// activate, so the refusal is the machine verdict there too (NET-143): /// printed verbatim, never wrapped as `CreateSession failed: ...` — a /// wrapper that called the daemon's verdict an RPC failure would mislabel /// it and bury the remedy's shape under a generic prefix. diff --git a/crates/minimald-rpc/src/lib.rs b/crates/minimald-rpc/src/lib.rs index 04a9998084..27ae8df607 100644 --- a/crates/minimald-rpc/src/lib.rs +++ b/crates/minimald-rpc/src/lib.rs @@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ pub fn version_skew_message(cli: &str, daemon: &str) -> Option { }) } -/// How a user-namespace refusal opens (NET-141): the daemon formats a +/// How a user-namespace refusal opens (NET-143): the daemon formats a /// create refused on the host's user-namespace verdict as this lead, the /// cause (`sandbox2::UsernsRestriction::cause`) closing the parenthesis, /// and the cause's remedy for the daemon on a second line. Clients print diff --git a/crates/minimald/src/main.rs b/crates/minimald/src/main.rs index 2c55f84f49..d5d24698f2 100644 --- a/crates/minimald/src/main.rs +++ b/crates/minimald/src/main.rs @@ -1053,7 +1053,7 @@ async fn async_main() -> Result<(), MainError> { std::env::var(EGRESS_DENY_ALL_OPT_OUT_ENV).ok().as_deref(), ), // Live: the create gate probes this process on every create - // (NET-141). The preflight below switches it off under + // (NET-143). The preflight below switches it off under // `MINIMALD_USERNS_GATE=off`. user_namespace_gate: minimald::server::UsernsGate::Live, }; @@ -1084,7 +1084,7 @@ async fn async_main() -> Result<(), MainError> { // this process's own privileges and AppArmor label are what the kernel // will check. On a restricted host (stock Ubuntu 24.04+ with an // unconfined daemon) that denial otherwise surfaces only when the first - // attach dies writing /proc/self/uid_map. The create gate (NET-141) + // attach dies writing /proc/self/uid_map. The create gate (NET-143) // refuses every session with the cause and the remedy before allocating // anything, re-probing on each create so a remedy applied to the running // host takes effect without a restart; this start-up read only warns diff --git a/crates/minimald/src/rpc.rs b/crates/minimald/src/rpc.rs index 87d082078e..ef810d1724 100644 --- a/crates/minimald/src/rpc.rs +++ b/crates/minimald/src/rpc.rs @@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ async fn serve_create_session( return Ok(Errorable::Err { error: message }); } - // The user-namespace gate (NET-141): a host that refuses the + // The user-namespace gate (NET-143): a host that refuses the // unprivileged user namespace every session sandbox starts by // unsharing would otherwise mint a session whose first attach // dies writing /proc/self/uid_map, with the cause in this log @@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ async fn serve_create_session( /// carries. const HOST_IP_ENFORCEMENT_ATTR: &str = "host_ip_enforcement"; -/// The refusal a host's user-namespace restriction yields (NET-141): the +/// The refusal a host's user-namespace restriction yields (NET-143): the /// wire crate's lead — what the client recognises the refusal by — around /// the cause in the words the person reads, then that cause's own remedy /// for the daemon on its own line: the install step and the restart it @@ -5591,7 +5591,7 @@ mod tests { ); } - /// The user-namespace gate (NET-141): a host whose verdict refuses the + /// The user-namespace gate (NET-143): a host whose verdict refuses the /// sandbox refuses the create itself, and the reply carries the verdict /// — the cause in words and that cause's own remedy — with nothing /// allocated for a caller to tear down. The gate is this server's own diff --git a/crates/minimald/src/server.rs b/crates/minimald/src/server.rs index d975dd0b18..2df789fce8 100644 --- a/crates/minimald/src/server.rs +++ b/crates/minimald/src/server.rs @@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ pub struct Config { #[serde(default)] pub deny_all_opt_out: bool, /// How the create gate learns the host's verdict on the unprivileged - /// user namespace every session sandbox starts by unsharing (NET-141). + /// user namespace every session sandbox starts by unsharing (NET-143). /// Never persisted or handed in: the daemon binary decides it at start /// (live, or off under `MINIMALD_USERNS_GATE=off`), and the test harness /// fixes it per server. @@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ pub fn this_daemon_path() -> String { /// dependency of their own. pub use sandbox2::UsernsRestriction; -/// Where the create gate's user-namespace verdict comes from (NET-141). +/// Where the create gate's user-namespace verdict comes from (NET-143). #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Default)] pub enum UsernsGate { /// Probe this process on every create — a few `/proc` reads — so a @@ -799,7 +799,7 @@ impl ServerStateHandle { } /// The host's user-namespace verdict the create gate decides on - /// (NET-141), per [`Config::user_namespace_gate`]: probed live from this + /// (NET-143), per [`Config::user_namespace_gate`]: probed live from this /// process on each call, so nothing is cached across creates; the lock /// is held for the copy of the gate alone, never across the probe. pub(crate) async fn user_namespace_verdict(&self) -> Option { diff --git a/crates/sandbox2/src/lib.rs b/crates/sandbox2/src/lib.rs index f5fa2457b7..99e0e95054 100644 --- a/crates/sandbox2/src/lib.rs +++ b/crates/sandbox2/src/lib.rs @@ -2931,7 +2931,7 @@ fn shell_word(path: &str) -> String { /// a loss of isolation. /// /// A `Some` is not advisory: `minimald` gates every session create on it -/// (NET-141), refusing the create with this cause and its remedy, so a false +/// (NET-143), refusing the create with this cause and its remedy, so a false /// `Some` — a host whose kernel would in fact allow the unshare — refuses /// every session on that host. Three facts are read, each live from `/proc` /// on every call, so a remedy applied to a running host takes effect at the @@ -3730,7 +3730,7 @@ mod tests { /// The daemon's AppArmor remedy names the install step for the /// installed daemon and, on its own line, the loader with `--path` for /// this daemon's own path, so a source-built daemon is covered too - /// (NET-141). + /// (NET-143). #[test] fn daemon_apparmor_remedy_names_finalize_install_and_this_binary() { let remedy = UsernsRestriction::ApparmorUnconfined.remedy(RemedyTarget::Daemon { @@ -3756,7 +3756,7 @@ mod tests { /// The mip AppArmor remedy is a command the operator pastes, so a data /// dir or binary path with a space stays one shell word, while a plain - /// path is shown bare (NET-141). + /// path is shown bare (NET-143). #[test] fn mip_apparmor_remedy_quotes_paths_with_spaces() { let remedy = UsernsRestriction::ApparmorUnconfined.remedy(RemedyTarget::Mip { diff --git a/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md b/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md index c1a4f85309..f9c5600b8c 100644 --- a/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md +++ b/docs/specs/18-spec-box-networking/18-spec-box-networking.md @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ included, with every refusal logged (NET-001 to NET-004). verify: cargo nextest run -p minimald run_box_ends_when_its_run_ends -- **NET-141** WHEN an activation targets a host whose user-namespace verdict refuses the sandbox THE SYSTEM SHALL fail the activation before the session is created, name the cause, exit non-zero, and leave no session behind. +- **NET-143** WHEN an activation targets a host whose user-namespace verdict refuses the sandbox THE SYSTEM SHALL fail the activation before the session is created, name the cause, exit non-zero, and leave no session behind. tier: T0 verify: cargo nextest run -p minimal activate_refuses_unconfinable_sandbox_before_session_creation verify: cargo nextest run -p minimald create_reply_carries_user_namespace_verdict