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SECURITY: actions-runner: distrust emSign G3 (CVE-2026-111943) - #1115

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security-actions-runner-openssl-ca
Oct 28, 2026
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security-actions-runner-openssl-ca

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Why

CVE-2026-111943 (eMudhra intermediate key compromise, Mozilla bug 2083449). The runner bundles its own node in externals/node20 (v20.20.2) and externals/node24 (v24.18.0). Both trust their compiled-in root store, which still holds emSign ECC Root CA - G3.

That node runs every JavaScript action on the host: checkout, cache, upload-artifact, and so on. The truststore audit (pkgmgr-rs#1091, fleet run e75e32d0) lists the package as shipped, and pkgmgr-rs#1017 tracks it.

What

  • Both wrappers export NODE_OPTIONS=--use-openssl-ca. That's actions-runner and actions-runner-config. With it, the bundled node trusts OpenSSL's default store (OPENSSLDIR=/etc/ssl), which is our ca-certificates. The flag is prepended to any existing NODE_OPTIONS. It's skipped if the caller already chose --use-openssl-ca or --use-bundled-ca.
  • ca-certificates is now a runtime dep.
  • Inheritance: the runner's processes inherit the environment, so JS actions and node in run: steps get the flag too. A workflow that sets its own NODE_OPTIONS replaces it for that workflow's steps. That's the one gap.
  • New test bundled_node_uses_system_store. It adds a throwaway CA to a copy of the system bundle (via SSL_CERT_FILE) and serves a leaf signed by it on 127.0.0.1. Through the wrapper, bundled node20 and node24 must connect, which only works if they read OpenSSL's store. As a control, the same bare node must refuse.

Not done: swapping externals/node* for our node-lts

That was the first-choice fix, but it would break container jobs. The runner mounts externals/ into job containers at /__e (ContainerInfo.cs) and runs JS actions with /__e/node24/bin/node. A symlink to /usr/bin/node would dangle inside the container, and our node is linked against our glibc anyway.

With this PR, container jobs keep the bundled node and the image's own store, unchanged. docker exec doesn't pass the runner's environment.

The env approach also covers two cases a binary swap wouldn't:

  • Existing RUNNER_HOME copies. The wrapper copies /usr/lib/actions-runner only once.
  • A runner that has self-updated, which re-downloads upstream's externals.

node20

node20 is kept. Runner 2.336.0 already runs node20 actions on node24 by default (since 2026-06-16). It still picks node20 when a job opts out with ACTIONS_ALLOW_USE_UNSECURE_NODE_VERSION=true, so removing it would break that path. The flag covers node20 too.

Evidence

The TLS trust harness from #976 was extended with vendor rows. The probe reaches the bundled node through /usr/bin/actions-runner, using a RUNNER_HOME whose run.sh just runs its arguments. So the probe sees exactly the environment the wrapper sets. Live mode, 12 eMudhra hosts plus 2 positives, on arm64.

Before: pkgs main 44a31a3

client          | version                      | emSign      | AAA         | positive            | verdict
runner-node20   | v20.20.2                     | 0F/6C/0?    | 6F/0C/0?    | OK,OK               | VULNERABLE
runner-node24   | v24.18.0                     | 0F/6C/0?    | 6F/0C/0?    | OK,OK               | VULNERABLE
SELFTEST        | store minus anchors          | 6F/0C/0?    | 6F/0C/0?    | OK,OK               | FIXED
NEGCONTROL      | store plus anchors           | 0F/6C/0?    | 0F/6C/0?    | OK,OK               | VULNERABLE

After: this PR's head 9c26ea3

client          | version                      | emSign      | AAA         | positive            | verdict
runner-node20   | v20.20.2                     | 6F/0C/0?    | 6F/0C/0?    | OK,OK               | FIXED
runner-node24   | v24.18.0                     | 6F/0C/0?    | 6F/0C/0?    | OK,OK               | FIXED
SELFTEST        | store minus anchors          | 6F/0C/0?    | 6F/0C/0?    | OK,OK               | FIXED
NEGCONTROL      | store plus anchors           | 0F/6C/0?    | 0F/6C/0?    | OK,OK               | VULNERABLE

NODE_USE_SYSTEM_CA=1 was also tried, in a separate probe with the same probe script. It doesn't help: both bundled nodes still connect to the emSign hosts, because that flag adds the system store to the bundled one.

Other checks:

  • min session (arm64): min package build --rebuild actions-runner, then min check. Everything passes, standalone tests included.
  • Negative control: with the export line replaced by a no-op, the standalone tests read Fail. A fresh session was used for that run.

amd64 is covered only by the build-bot build. The harness here runs on arm64.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

…26-111943)

The runner's externals/node20 and node24 trust their compiled-in root
store, which still holds emSign ECC Root CA - G3. Both wrappers now export
NODE_OPTIONS=--use-openssl-ca, so they trust OpenSSL's default store, our
ca-certificates (now a runtime dep). Not done by swapping in node-lts: the
runner mounts externals/ into job containers, where a symlink would
dangle. A new standalone test proves the store in use through the wrapper,
with a control that the bare bundled node refuses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@bryan-minimal
bryan-minimal requested a review from a team as a code owner October 26, 2026 22:44
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Checked that the bundled Linux node20 and node24 builds set OPENSSLDIR="/etc/ssl" (deps/openssl/openssl_common.gypi), and that ca-certificates installs /etc/ssl/cert.pem, so --use-openssl-ca resolves to our store. The NODE_OPTIONS case guard respects a caller's existing store choice. The new test has a negative control (bare node must refuse), and CI is green. The container-job gap is documented.

@bryan-minimal
bryan-minimal added this pull request to the merge queue Oct 28, 2026
Merged via the queue into main with commit 7f4527c Oct 28, 2026
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@bryan-minimal
bryan-minimal deleted the security-actions-runner-openssl-ca branch October 28, 2026 19:25
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